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Structured abstract 
 
Purpose of this paper: to report results from a rape trial reconstruction in Ireland  
 
Design/methodology/approach: A studio audience of 100 members of the Irish public were 
selected to attend a TV programme by the Republic of Ireland’s national broadcasting 
organisation (RTÉ). This involved the examination of the sentencing of a rape case. The 
audience’s sentencing preferences were measured at the outset, when they had been given 
only summary information about the case, and later, when full details had been disclosed.  
 
Findings: Previous research examining changes in public attitudes to crime and punishment 
has shown that deliberation, including the provision of new information and discussion 
with others and experts, tends to decrease public punitiveness and increase public leniency 
towards sentencing. An experiment in Ireland, however, showed that providing 
information does not invariably and necessarily moderate punitive attitudes. This article 
presents the results, and offers some explanations for the anomalous outcome.   
 
Research limitations: The pre/post design, in which the audience served as their own 
controls, is a weak one, and participants may have responded to what they took to be the 
agenda of the producers. 
- Due to the quality of the sample, the results may not be generalizable to the broader 
Irish population.  
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Practical implications:  
- Policy makers should recognise that the public is not uniformly punitive for all 
crimes. There is good research evidence to show that  the apparent public appetite 
for tough punishment is illusory, and is a function of the way that polls measure 
public attitudes to punishment.  
- However the ‘information hypothesis’ is too often stated in overly simple terms, that 
fuller and more accurate information about specific cases necessarily moderates 
public punitiveness.   
- The experiment presented here serves as a counter-example, showing that a sample 
of the public failed to moderate their views when given fuller information about a 
rape case involving serious violence and a vulnerable victim. 
- Sentencers and those responsible for sentencing policy would benefit from a fuller 
understanding of the sorts of cases which illicit strong punitive responses from the 
public, and the reasons for this response. 
- However any such understanding should not simply translate into responsiveness 
to the public’s punitive sentiments – where these exist.  
 
What is original/value of paper: There have been limited research studies which reports 
factors which may increase punitiveness through the provision of information and 
deliberation.  
 
Background 
    
Past studies have shown that in many developed industrialised countries, the public 
consistently believes sentencing practice to be too lenient. At the same time, they tend to be 
poorly informed about the realities of sentencing practice, and to underestimate the 
severity of court sentences (Roberts 1992; Roberts and Stalans 1997Cullen et al. 2000; 
Roberts and Hough, 2002, 2005; Kury et al. 2002;). A consistent finding is that the least 
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well-informed are the most punitive, holding negative views about the criminal justice 
system (Hough and Roberts 1998; Mattison and Mirrlees-Black 2000). 
 
Experimental studies designed to unpick the relationships between knowledge and 
punitivity have suggested that less punitive attitudes are uncovered when methodologies 
are used that allow the provision of information and deliberation (Doob and Roberts 1998; 
Chapman, Mirrlees-Black and Brown 2002; Indermaur and Hough 2002; Hough and Park 
2002; Luskin, Fishkin and Jowell 2002; Hutton 2005; Keijser, Koppen and Elffers 2007; 
Warner and Davis 2012).  
 
A set of experiments conducted by Doob and Roberts (1988) for the Canadian Sentencing 
Commission in the early 1980s are probably the earliest and most cited tests of the 
‘information hypothesis’. The studies involved random allocation of survey respondents to 
varying conditions in which they were given varying media reports of real sentencing 
decisions or detailed information from the court hearing of the same cases. Respondents 
who read newspaper accounts were significantly more punitive in their sentencing and 
also more likely to disapprove of the judge’s decision than those who were given detailed 
court-based information.  The essential finding – that the provision of information 
attenuates punitiveness and moderates criticism of sentencers – has subsequently been 
replicated in a range of other jurisdictions (see for example de Keijser et al. (2007) in the 
Netherlands and Warner and Davis (2012) in Australiab, ). 
 
Further evidence in support of the hypothesis comes from a large-scale deliberative pollc 
conducted in 1994, which demonstrated that participants became less punitive on various 
issues relating to crime and punishment (Luskin et al. 2002). More importantly, this 
attitudinal change was not simply a short-term phenomenon but endured over a period of 
many months (Hough and Park 2002). Chapman, Mirrlees-Black, and Brown (2002) 
explored different means of presenting information to the public. Simple facts about crime 
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and the criminal justice system in three formats – booklets, seminars and videos – were all 
found to be effective – to varying degrees – in moderating punitive attitudes.   
 
Lastly, in Scotland Hutton (2005) reported the results of a survey that – in keeping with 
earlier work – found that when asked general questions about the performance of criminal 
justice agencies, people tended to express punitive views; but in response to individual 
cases, they were less punitive and expressed more satisfaction with sentencing.  If there is a 
significant body of research in support of the ‘information hypothesis’, Hutton usefully 
reminds us that punitive attitudes coexist with more tolerant ones, and that punitive 
attitudes expressed, for example in response to news reports, are no less real than those 
that emerge after deliberation. Whatever the sources of these attitudes, they are often 
strongly and sincerely felt.  
 
The Irish experiment: methods         
          
The experiment reported here was carried out by RTÉ – The Republic of Ireland’s national 
broadcasting organisation - which provides public service broadcasting. The programme 
was developed in late 2006 and early 2007, following intense criticism of the sentencing of 
various criminal cases, including rapes. The producers of RTÉ’s flagship current affairs 
programme Prime Time proposed a programme examining whether judges were in fact out 
of touch. They were interested in a version of deliberative polling, and asked one of us 
(MH) to provide academic advice. The programme was screened in April 2007d, and 
subsequently won an award.   
 
A studio audience of 100 members of the public were selected to attend the event. This 
involved the examination of the sentencing of three quite recent court cases– two involving 
homicide and one rape. The audience’s sentencing preferences were measured at the 
outset, when they had been given only summary information about the case, and later, 
when full details had been disclosed.  Only the rape case represented a fair test of the 
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information hypothesis. It t included a detailed re-enactment of key parts of the trial. Much 
less time was devoted to the homicide cases, in which the presenter simply read out to the 
audience further details about the case to the audience. Thus this paper presents findings 
only for the rape case.  
  
The programme was shot entirely in a television studio, with an auditorium layout with 
seating for the audience and a stage for re-enactment. In the rape case, the presenter read 
out about the bare facts of the case – as would be reported in the media – as follows:  
 
This was the brutal rape of a young woman walking home in the early hours after an 
evening spent with friends. She became quite nervous when a man got up from where he 
had been sitting on a wall and began to follow her, then passed her and went out of sight. 
But he suddenly jumped out at her and held what he said was a knife to her throat. He 
grabbed her mobile phone and beat her with it and his fist till she bled.  He beat her so badly 
that she still carries the marks. He forced her up the lane, onto her hands and knees pushed 
his fingers into her and made her perform oral sex on him. And so she was left in the lane 
having been threatened with death, raped and her mobile phone stolen. 
 
The audience were then invited to ‘sentence’  the offender (using a questionnaire referred 
to as the ‘pre-poll’). Once the audience had made their ‘preliminary sentence’ and their 
questionnaires had been collected, there was a re-enactment of key parts of the court 
proceedings, based on transcripts, which included statements by the victim, the defendant 
and a police sergeant, and the summing up and sentencing by the judge.  The cast were 
professional actors, but acted without props or costumes. First, the ‘police sergeant’ gave 
an edited (but faithful) version of the original transcript of the police evidence setting out 
the facts of the case, which detailed the precise nature of the offence, including vaginal 
penetration, oral sex, assault causing injury and robbery. This was followed by evidence 
from the ‘victim’, in which she read out the victim impact statement that the real victim had 
prepared for the hearing. This convincingly established that she had been seriously 
traumatised by the event. It also made reference to strong religious beliefs, and the fact that 
6 
 
the young woman had been contemplating taking holy orders before the crime. Next, the 
‘defendant’ was cross-examined by his defence counsel. This established that: 
 
 he was of previous good character, and was from a ‘good family’ 
 he said that he felt great remorse and apologised profusely 
 he had had a troubled childhood, suffering sexual abuse, and was subject to 
considerable bullying at school 
 he was currently under medical treatment for depression and was also being 
treated for alcohol addiction. 
 
The re-enactment thus provided the audience with much more information than was given 
by the presenter at the outset (or than would be contained in typical newspaper reports).  
It included details about the offence, the victim and the offender, including on the one hand 
graphic accounts of a violent sexual crime and on the other, extensive potentially mitigating 
circumstances. To our knowledge this experiment is the only test of the ‘information 
hypothesis’ that has attempted to reconstruct key elements of the court proceedings using 
actors.   
 
The ‘judge’ then gave his summing up, but before he moved to pass sentence, participants 
were asked to complete a ‘post-poll’ questionnaire in which they once again were asked  
‘pass sentence’, it being made clear to them that they were free to revise in the light of the 
extra information that had been presented to them. Separate to the case study exercise, 
participants were also asked to answer other attitudinal questions on crime and 
punishment in both the pre- and post-polls.  
 
RTÉ used a market research company - TNS mrbi – to assemble the sample of 104 
participants who had agreed to attend RTÉ’s recording studio for a full day for the 
experiment. The group did not appear to be grossly unrepresentative of the general public 
in terms of demographics. The survey company was able to benchmark the sample’s 
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attitudes to punishment against those of a nationally representative sample that had been 
interviewed on attitudes to punishment a year earlier, before the experiment. Both the 
experimental and the national samples were asked how concerned they were about crime, 
and whether they thought crime was rising. Although the national poll found considerable 
concern (85% of the sample saying ‘concerned’) 99% of the studio audience expressed 
concern. Similarly the studio audience was more likely to think that crime was rising (90% 
against 69%)e. Both differences were statistically significant and this raises the possibility 
that the studio audience is atypical of the wider population.  
 
The reason likely lies in the fact that the experiment required considerable commitment 
from participants – a full day in a studio, which would most attract those who are 
interested in, and concerned about, crime and criminal justice matters.. Whether the 
skewed nature of the studio sample vitiates the experiment is open to question. There are 
plausible reasons for thinking that the attitudes of people who are especially concerned 
about crime may be insulated from the effects of deliberation and information – a point to 
which we shall return. 
  
Results and discussion 
   
This section first compares the sentences ‘passed’ by the experimental sample in the pre- 
and post-polls. We shall focus on the gross attitudinal change comparing pre- and post-
polls. Ideally, we would have liked to have analysed individual-level data, which would 
have enabled us to investigate individual changes as well as net effects for the whole 
sample, but we do not have the necessary micro data.  
 
The studio audience first ‘passed sentence’ after the presenter had outlined in a few 
sentences the nature of the case. The audience then watched the re-enactment of the 
hearing, up to, but excluding the passing of sentence; and at this point they again selected a 
8 
 
sentence. The table summarises responses in both the pre- and post-polls. In both cases, 
nobody selected any sentence other than imprisonment.  
 
 
Table I Preferred sentence in pre- and post-polls 
 
The table shows that there was very little change in preferences for determinate sentences 
of under 12 years. Almost identical proportions opted for sentences of four or less years, of 
sentences between five and seven years, and of sentences between eight and eleven years. 
However proportions opting for life sentences fell by five percentage points, and those 
voting for long determinant sentences grew by three percentage pointsf.  Although we do 
not have the individual level data to permit statistical tests, changes of this size would not 
achieve statistical significance. The pre- and post-polls showed no overall change in the 
median score on the length of imprisonmentg, which was ten years in each case. 
 
Once respondents had ‘passed sentence’ in the second poll, the actual sentence was 
revealed, with the ‘judge’ speaking from the transcript of the original judge’s sentencing 
comments:  
 
So balancing the factors as best I can, on the rape counts I sentence him to six years 
imprisonment and on the robbery count to three years all to date from today as he took 
proactive steps to bring in his plea at the first available opportunity and never occupied a 
trial date which is consistent with his attitude of remorse.  On that count I suspend on 
condition the final 18 months of that sentence.  I also direct that he be given credit for 30 
days in respect of time spent in custody on remand.  I direct that he undergo a period of 
post release supervision for three years, and I am required by statute to warn him that he 
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faces further periods of imprisonment if he disobeys any of the terms of the post release 
supervision. 
 
This means that the offender would serve four and a half years of the longest concurrent 
sentence of six year (automatically serving the shorter three year sentence), after which he 
would be released on licence for three years. This is broadly equivalent to a sentence of 
around nine years in England and Wales and to six years in Scotlandh. 
 
In both the pre-and post-poll around a fifth of the audience chose a sentence that was 
broadly at this level of severity (between five and seven years). Assuming that those opting 
for a lighter sentence would readily tolerate the slightly heavier sentence that was actually 
passed, the table shows that both before and after the re-enactment a minimum of around 
three in ten of the audience would find the sentence acceptable.   
 
However, after the actual sentence had been revealed, the audience was actually asked for 
their assessment of the sentence. One per cent thought it “much too tough; 3% said “a bit 
too tough”; 14% said “about right”; 26% said it was a bit too lenient; and the remaining 
56% thought it “much too lenient”.  A measure of acceptability can be derived from 
summing the three groups who found the sentence “a bit too tough”, “a bit too lenient” and 
“about right”. This suggests that a large minority (43%) would be broadly tolerant of the 
sentence actually passed.  
 
Whether this degree of correspondence between public preferences and court practice is 
acceptable is a matter of judgement. Whatever the case, the results of the experiment offer 
little support for the information hypothesis. The overall tenor of preferences remained 
largely unchanged, with no evidence of convergence around the sentence actually passed. 
The only suggestion of an effect can be found in the five percentage point fall in the net 
number of respondents who opted for a life sentence – and it is unlikely that this change 
would reach statistical significance in a sample of 104. Certainly there was no evidence that 
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the re-enactment had increased confidence in the competence of the judiciary in the way 
that the information hypothesis implies: the proportion of the audience who felt that 
judges “do a poor or very poor job” moved from 28% to 54% - result that will have been 
statistically significant. 
 
Why did the additional information presented in the course of the trial re-enactment fail to 
moderate punitive responses?  The case certainly was not short on mitigating factors that 
were initially hidden from the audience: no previous convictions, the expression of 
remorse, the defendant’s early history of being sexually abused and bullied, and his history 
of depression. There seemed to be plenty of information to ‘individualise’ the case from the 
‘general’, upon which punitive opinions might be based (Hutton 2005).  
 
We can offer three types of explanation for the finding. The first two concern problems 
relating to the internal and external validity of the experiment, respectively. The third is 
that the experiment offers real – if tentative – evidence about the sort of cases in which 
information and deliberation fail to moderate punitive attitudes.  
 
Internal validity 
The internal validity of the experiment is concerned with the extent to which it accurately 
managed an experimental manipulation and accurately measured change in the sampled 
population that can be attributed to the manipulation.  The experiment is open to criticism 
at three levels: 
 
1. The pre/post design, in which the audience served as their own controls, is a 
weak one, and participants may have responded to what they took to be the agenda 
of the producers. In an ideal world it would be preferable to have separate 
experimental and control groups, with the latter exposed to some irrelevant 
experience to match the court re-enactment.  It is, of course, totally unrealistic to 
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expect a television production company to underwrite this degree of methodological 
sophistication (and cost).  
 
2.  In the nature of an event of this sort, filmed for television, only limited 
information was given about sentencing options and release provisions. Although 
there was scope for questions and comments from the audience, there was certainly 
not much time or scope for deliberation. So the event fell short of the format of a 
‘deliberative’ poll. However, the experiment clearly did succeed in presenting a great 
deal of texture and detail on the case where respondents were provided with details 
from court proceedings. 
 
3. Whilst the re-enactment was skilfully performed by trained actors it is 
possible that their performance may have sensitised the audience to extraneous and 
irrelevant factors. Our own judgement about the performances is that the 
‘defendant’ was rather unlikeable, and his evidence not very compelling. And 
perhaps more important, the ‘judge’ lacked much authority in his delivery. Leaving 
aside the substance of ‘his’ judgement, his performance lacked any gravitas. Of 
course, it may indeed have been the case that in real life the defendant was 
unlikeable and the judge lacked charisma, but none of those involved in the 
experiment were in a position to know this. Obviously this is a risk inherent in the 
re-enactment approach, and one that is hard to assess or quantify objectively – but 
as is clear from the rating of judicial competence in the pre- and post-poll, something 
happened to erode the sample’s confidence, and this may have been to do with the 
performances of the actors as much as the sentence process that they were 
portraying.   
 
 
External validity 
The external validity of the experiment may also be open to question. That is, the 
experiment may have accurately characterised the effects (or in this case, lack of effects) of 
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the experimental manipulation on the target group, but these results may not be 
generalizable to the broader Irish population. The first reason for thinking this is that there 
was intense concern about sentencing at the time of the experiment. Whilst the producers 
of any current affairs programme would obviously want programmes to be topical, the 
Prime Time team at RTÉ in this case certainly could not have anticipated that another rape 
case would hit the headlines immediately before the event, and that the sentence for this 
case would be heavily criticised. Most of the audience will have been exposed to the media 
uproar about the case, and this will probably have promoted a sense that sentencing – and 
especially sentencing of rape cases – was in crisis. Arguably, the results might have been 
different had the programme been made immediately before, rather than after, the new 
case hit the headlines. 
 
Second, as we discussed in the methods section, when benchmarked against a national 
sample, the audience emerged as more concerned about crime. They may have been a self-
selected audience for whom crime and justice were big issues. Few would argue that the 
information hypothesis is universal in its application: that any social group – provided with 
information and the time to think – might change their opinions. There are good reasons 
for thinking that people with strongly held attitudes may be especially resistant to change.  
Crudely, the argument would be that prejudiced people are by definition unprepared to 
modify their views in the face of new information (and indeed there is a large literature on 
the dynamics of right-wing authoritarian attitudes). We obviously cannot say to what 
extent the audience could be characterised in these terms, but their response to the re-
enactment may not have been typical of the wider Irish population.     
 
A real effect? Limits to the impact of information and deliberation 
Another possibility is that information and explanation moderates punitivity only for some 
types of criminal cases (Warner and Davis 2012). Where cases involve vulnerable victims 
or where high levels of violence are used, many people simply want very tough sentences.  
We suspect that the victim’s character (religious belief, vulnerability) and subsequent 
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traumatisation may have proved particularly salient for the audience.  While the re-
enactment presented a number of mitigating factors for the defendant, the victim impact 
statement may have fully offset these. It should be said, however, that there are plenty of 
tests of the information hypothesis where added information has moderated attitudes in 
very serious cases. 
 
This points to the obvious possibility that information does not always and necessarily 
make people less punitive: it depends on the nature of the information. People tend to think 
stereotypically about crime, imagining the worst case to be the norm. Thus in most cases 
fuller information serves to challenge the stereotype, and moderates punitive responses. 
However, when people are confronted with crimes that are consistent with their 
stereotypes, the ‘information effect’ is no longer to be found.   
 
Whilst this conclusion must be regarded as tentative, it is perfectly compatible with 
previous research on the topic, which has typically focused on less serious offences, such as 
burglary (Hough and Roberts, 1998, 1999; Chapman, Mirrlees-Black and Brawn 2002 
Hutton 2005;). It is significant that the 1994 deliberative poll demonstrated that although 
exposure to information reduced punitiveness in various aspects of crime and punishment, 
there was no reduction in support for the death penalty, or for making a life sentence 
actually mean life (Luskin et al. 2002: 469).  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The experiment reported here has problems of both internal and external validity but our 
tentative interpretation of its results is the simple one that when people are confronted 
with grave crimes – as distinct from the vast majority of cases passing through the criminal 
process – they favour punitive sentences – or at least sentences that are more punitive than 
the norm in their jurisdiction. This conclusion is unlikely to hold across all cultures and 
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across different justice systems, of course, but it may accurately characterise western 
industrialised democracies. The explanation for the limits to the moderating effects of 
information and deliberation are probably to be found in the way in which many people 
hold stereotypes of crime and of offenders that match not the norm but the worst case. 
When they are given information that prompts them to adjust or abandon the stereotype, 
their views on punishment may in that case change. However, where they are asked about 
crimes which are indeed very serious, their responses remain punitive in the face of 
additional information. 
 
This conclusion is commonsensical, but worth reporting, nevertheless, as the ‘information 
hypothesis’ is too often stated in overly simple terms, that suggest that beneath the surface, 
there is no real public demand for tough punishment. This position may be tenable for the 
majority of cases that come up for sentencing, but we suspect that it is unlikely to hold 
where victims are vulnerable, where serious and gratuitous violence is used, or where 
there is a sexual motive. 
 
This paper has been written some seven years after the experiment was actually mounted, 
and nearly never saw the light of day. There are several reasons for this. As we have 
discussed, there were weaknesses in the experimental design, and especially in sampling, 
offering challenges to the validity of its conclusions. The programme producers had to 
make inevitable trades between methodological purity and practicability.  This reduced the 
priority that we gave to the reporting of the results in an academic journal. Nevertheless, 
relative to most academic experiments, this was a well-resourced project whose results 
deserve to be recorded in a less ephemeral medium than a current affairs programme. Its 
implications for sentencing practice are to be found in the way that it qualifies the findings 
of previous research suggesting that information about cases tends to moderate public 
punitivity.  
 
 
Endnotes 
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a We would like to thank Paul Loughlin, who produced the programme for Prime Time, RTÉ, for agreement to 
use the data from the experiement reported here. 
 
b This research was an especially robust test of the information hypothesis, in that it canvassed the 
opinions of jurors about the sentences of cases that they had served on, and were thus especially 
well informed about case details.  
  
c. In 1994 in Manchester, James Fishkin in collaboration with the National Centre for Social 
Research and Channel 4 Television conducted the world’s first deliberative poll on crime. 
Deliberative polls are designed to identify the attitudes and policy preferences that the general 
population would hold if they had the time and energy to inform themselves properly about the 
issues. For more details about the origin, rational and methodology of deliberative polling, see 
Luskin, Fishkin and Jowell (2002) and Fishkin, Luskin and Jowell (2000). 
 
d. http://www.rte.ie/presspack/2007/03/15/prime-time-the-big-picture/ Last accessed on 2                
December 2014. 
 
e. The wording of the two questions was: To what extent are you concerned or not about crime and 
public order maintenance in our society?  How do you think the level of crime in the country as a 
whole has changed over the past two years? 
 
f. It is possible that the five who changed from  ‘life’ in the pre-poll opted for 12+ years in the post-
poll, but in the absence of individual level analysis we cannot be sure of this.  
 
g.  In calculating the median sentence length, we assumed that life sentences should be treated as 
being equivalent to at least 12 years.    
 
h. The two jurisdictions have different arrangements for early release. A lay person’s  reading of the 
Sentencing Council’s guidelines for this offence in England and Wales would suggest that a nine-
year sentence would fall at the top end of the range of possible sentences for a remorseful 
defendant of good character pleading guilty to an offence of this sort at an early stage and 
expressing remorse.  
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